UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

L'ASSOCIATION DES AMERICAINS
ACCIDENTELS, et al., Civil Action
No. 20-03573 (TSC)
Plaintiff(s),
v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF STATE, et al.,
Washington, D.C.

January 9, 2023
Defendant(s).
MOTION HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE TANYA S. CHUTKAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES :

FOR THE PLAINTIFF(S): Noam B. Schreiber, Esquire Lawrence M. Zell, Esquire Zell, Aron \& Co. 34 Ben Yehuda Street 15th Floor Jerusalem Israel

FOR THE DEFENDANT(S): Laurel H. Lum, Esquire Anthony Coppolin, Esquire United States Department of Justice 1100 L Street Suite 11008 Washington, D.C. 20530

REPORTED BY:
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The following proceedings began at 2:27 p.m.:
THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Your Honor, we have Civil
Action 20-3573, L'Association Des Americains Accidentels, et al. -- I hope I did a good job of that -- versus the United States Department of State. We have Mr. Lawrence Zell and Mr. Noam Schreiber representing the plaintiffs. And we have Ms. Laurel Lum and Mr. Anthony Coppolino representing the State Department and others.

THE COURT: All right. Everyone, good afternoon. We are here for oral argument in this matter.

I have read the parties' briefs, and as you noticed in my order, I asked that you not just restate your briefs.

Plaintiffs allege that the State Department's 2015 final rule which finalizes citizenship renunciation processing fee violates the Administrative Procedure Act and customary international law and that the imposition of the current fee and any fee whatsoever is unconstitutional under the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Defendants have moved for partial summary judgment and have also moved to dismiss, and plaintiffs have cross-moved for partial summary judgment.

Defendants argue the Court should dismiss plaintiffs' customary international law on Eighth Amendment claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and that plaintiffs' remaining claims should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 30.

Plaintiffs in their cross motion have asked for summary judgment on their First and Fifth Amendment claims as well as their customary international law claim.

Plaintiffs also have a pending motion to expedite before the Court, which I will rule on when I issue my decision on the pending dispositive motions.

So lastly, defendants have filed a notice of intent, I think it was late last week, Friday, maybe.

MR. ZELL: Friday.
THE COURT: Yes, a notice of intent to pursue rule making to reduce fee amount, yes, this past Friday in which they alerted the Court of the Department of State's intention to pursue rule making to reduce the fee for processing a request, renunciation request, from the current amount of $\$ 2,350$ to the prior amount of $\$ 450$.

So before we begin oral argument on the motions, I would like to hear from who's going to be speaking for the government?

MS. LUM: I will, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. And is it Ms. Lum?
MS. LUM: Ms. Lum.
THE COURT: All right. You can stay at counsel table if you like and remain seated if you wish, just make sure you speak into the microphone, or you can approach the podium, whichever you prefer.

MS. LUM: If it's all right with Your Honor, I would prefer to stay seated.

THE COURT: That's perfectly fine. we don't have a jury here.

MS. LUM: Is this loud enough?
THE COURT: As long as my court reporter can hear you, I can hear you. All right.

So, I mean, a notice of rule making doesn't really tell me when this is going to happen. Is it a matter of it's going to happen, it's just when?

MS. LUM: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And what is the scope, when will it begin, and when does state anticipate having a final rule reducing the amount?

MS. LUM: So I don't have an exact timing for you on when the rule would go into place. The department is actively pursuing that rule making. And we would be happy to update the Court of any formal developments as they occur.

THE COURT: So what happens between now or between last Friday and when the final rule making goes into effect? Does everybody who paid the current fee get to file something and ask for a rebate or a refund or something, or you are just out of luck?

MS. LUM: So I don't have an understanding on how that would work in terms of rebates and I --

THE COURT: That's a big difference. I mean, you are talking about almost a \$2,000 difference, well, between 2,350 and 450, which I think is what it's going back to. Yeah.

So if somebody has an exigent or urgent need for a renunciation claim to be processed and they can't wait until the end of the rule-making period and they have to pay this fee, I mean, they have no recourse once the fee is reduced?

MS. LUM: I don't have an understanding of whether there is a recourse. I don't believe that there is, but that's not something that I am prepared to speak on today.

THE COURT: Okay. It's something you might want to inquire into.

All right. Is it Mr. Zell or Mr. Schreiber who is speaking?

Mr. Zell.

MR. ZELL: I will be.
THE COURT: I understand from your reply that, despite the notice, you maintain your position given the length of time it may -- and obviously I wasn't able to get a time frame from Ms. Lum -- that it may take to reduce the fee.

Let me ask you this. Let's assume for purposes of argument that the fee was reduced tomorrow. Would you still maintain your claim?

MR. ZELL: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Is it your position that any fee is a
violation of plaintiffs' rights?
MR. ZELL: No. Our primary position is that the $\$ 450$ fee, which would remain under the government's notice of proposed rule making, would also violate what we have maintained is a fundamental inherent and natural constitutional right under the due process clause to expatriate.

THE COURT: I am ambushing you with this. You may not know. Do you know what the current fee is to file a citizenship application fee? I have actually filed such an application myself many years ago, but I'm sure it's gone up since then. Do you have any idea what that is?

MS. LUM: Unfortunately, I don't, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Could the Court take judicial notice of whatever that fee is?

MS. LUM: I assume the Court could take judicial notice of the fact of the fee, but I'm not sure how relevant --

THE COURT: If it were in the federal register or somewhere in CFR or in some federal regulation.

MS. LUM: Right. The Court could certainly take notice of the fact of it, but I'm not sure how relevant it would be to the analysis --

THE COURT: Well, I think it's kind of relevant. Let me ask you, again, I'm sorry, is it Mr. Zell?

MR. ZELL: I'm sorry, I apologize, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Is it Mr. Zell?

MR. ZELL: I didn't hear the Court's question.
THE COURT: I was asking Ms. Lum what the current citizenship application fee is. And the reason I am asking is because it seems analogous to me that the government -- do you disagree that the government can impose fees for certain administrative tasks?

MR. ZELL: I don't disagree with that statement.
THE COURT: So if you have to pay, say, a 400 -- I don't know what it is, but let's assume for purposes of argument that someone seeking U.S. citizenship has to pay a $\$ 450$ fee. And I remember it was pretty big when I applied many years ago so, you know. Would that be similarly violative? I mean, because the right -- I mean, citizenship is pretty fundamental, right? Would that similarly violate the Constitution and the APA in the manner you claim that this fee does?

MR. ZELL: That's an interesting question. It's one that we have actually looked at in terms of comparing the relative fees for different types of consular services. I believe, if I'm not mistaken, that the form for applying for naturalization by a noncitizen permanent resident would be entitled to apply for citizenship is called the $\mathrm{N}-600$.

THE COURT: I think that's it. There is a fee, then there's a fingerprint fee.

MR. ZELL: Right. So, and I believe that fee is --

I'm not a hundred percent certain, but you can find it on the internet. And I have asked my colleague here just to --

THE COURT: I don't mean to --
MR. ZELL: We don't have a connection. Okay.
THE COURT: -- derail the argument, but it's something that I have also been thinking about.

MR. ZELL: It's a fraction of the 2,350.
THE COURT: Right. But I suspect it's pretty close to $\$ 450$, so --

MR. ZELL: It could well be.
THE COURT: -- I guess my question to you is, how is that not violative of the Constitution and the APA as you claim this fee is? You claim that this 450 -- if the fee were reduced to $\$ 450$, you would still maintain your claims. Why isn't that similar to a fee to apply for naturalization?

MR. ZELL: Well, my first response, Your Honor, would be that the person applying for a -- for citizenship, filing the N-600, okay, is not a U.S. citizen and does not at that point have the same standing, in terms of the Constitution, as a U.S. citizen has for purposes of expatriation. That's one distinguishing factor.

THE COURT: I think I have had to rule on this in other circumstances, that the Constitution applies to anybody present on U.S. soil in the same regard.

MR. ZELL: That's true. And the question is what is
the nature of the right -- it's not before us today, but what is the nature of the right of the permanent resident seeking to be naturalized under $N$-600. Like, my mother, for example, came from Cuba. What is her -- what is their standing -- what is the nature of their constitutional right as opposed to the right of the plaintiffs in this case who are U.S. citizens, all of them? Yes, they have constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has said that once they are here in the United States as aliens, even permanent resident aliens, they have a full panoply of constitutional rights. But what are those rights vis-a-vis an expatriate? They would be somewhat different, I would think.

THE COURT: There are certainly some analogies to be drawn, for example, in the educational sector. But anyway, let me not --

MR. ZELL: If I may, Your Honor, I think it's appropriate for the Court -- the Court's question is entirely appropriate in my view.

THE COURT: I wouldn't have asked it if I didn't think it was.

MR. ZELL: But for purposes of comparing the amount of the fee, okay, vis-a-vis what's going on in our case, I think it's entirely --

THE COURT: I guess what $I$ am trying to get an idea of is, does your objection stem from the existence of the fee or
the amount of the fee? And if it's the amount of the fee, what would be appropriate? What would not run afoul of the Constitution?

MR. ZELL: Well, as I indicated earlier, I don't -- we don't dispute the ability of the government to collect some kind of a fee to cover or defray real actual costs incurred in connection with the administration of the government's role in the circumstances that we are talking about.

But what the amount of that fee is is a function of, as we have indicated in our papers, what the government's actual costs are. Now, I think we have seen, and this latest notice that the government has filed late Friday is -- calls into question the government's bona fides or credibility regarding their actual costs.

THE COURT: Are you allowed to do that under the APA? Under the APA, my review is fairly deferential. The government provides an explanation and a reason for the regulation and the fee. My role, as I understand it, is not to sit down and go through their breakdown of the costs with a fine-tooth comb, not on the APA anyway.

MR. ZELL: The government has done a very nice job in trying to portray this case as a conventional APA case. It is not. In fact, if the Court will look at our papers, the $\$ 450$ fee, which we are talking about at the moment, is not the subject of our APA claim. We don't have an APA claim with
respect to the 450. We do with respect to the 2,350 . With respect to the 450, our claim is purely constitutional and under customary international law.

THE COURT: So are you saying that if the final rule making occurred on Friday, you would withdraw your APA claim? MR. ZELL: No.

THE COURT: If the fee were reduced on Friday -MR. ZELL: Oh, the APA claim with respect to the 2,350? I think it would be moot at that point, okay, I mean, if they actually did what they say they are planning to do. THE COURT: Well, I mean, when they said they were going to raise it, they raised it. So I don't have any reason to believe that now they are saying they are going to lower it, they are not going to lower it.

MR. ZELL: Your Honor, if I may, one of the things, if you've studied, as I'm sure Your Honor has, the history of the rule making in this case, you will see, for example, when the government, if I'm not mistaken, decided in 2015 to quintuple the fee for renunciation, voluntary renunciation, of U.S. citizenship, they didn't wait, you know, 90 days or 60 days or -- they did it within a span of two weeks without any notice and common rule making prior to the implementation of the fee. So the government has the power, Your Honor, to implement this proposed change, reduction of fee, for all intents and purposes immediately if they wish to do so.

And I maintain that there's as much -- in fact, even more justification for the government to act expeditiously with respect to the reduction of the fee that they are now proposing, now in this case, more justification than they had in 2015 when they quintupled the 450 to reach the 2,350 fee.

THE COURT: I think the government's always in a bigger hurry to raise prices than lower them.

Let me ask you this: With regard to your Fifth
Amendment claim, what is your strongest argument for why the right to voluntarily expatriate is protected by the Fifth Amendment substantive due process clause?

MR. ZELL: Thank you, Your Honor. The argument is based on the Supreme Court's substantive due process analytical framework established in Washington versus Glucksberg. I don't want to get into any controversial topics, but recently affirmed just this year in the Dobbs case in connection with another constitutional right, which I will not mention.

But the framework that the Court set out in Glucksberg requires that the -- and the Court examine, first of all, the tradition -- the historical roots of the claimed right.

In this case -- and it's very interesting, because in our complaint itself, which has not within controverted as of yet by the government, we set out in great detail the history of this right, the right to expatriate going back literally to the day that this republic was declared in 1776.

And while there have been -- I can say that there have been very, very energetic discussions about this right even from the early days of the republic, there are not only statements by historical figures such as Thomas Jefferson and John Adams and others, but there are also legal decisions from the courts, treatises.

There's a famous treatise that $I$ just read the other day by George Hay, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Virginia, the Circuit of Virginia as it was then called, from 1814 called the Treatise of Expatriation and it dealt with this. It was the basis for a decision by the circuit court in New York in 1818 and on and on until we get to the Expatriation Act that Congress passed in 1868.

I am just -- I'm kind of fast-forwarding for Your Honor. Your Honor does not want us to repeat our brief. But that -- I don't think there can be any question that the right to expatriate, given these historical and legal authorities that we have cited, is deeply, deeply rooted in American law and politics, okay, and the philosophy of the American republic to such an extent, Your Honor, that founders of the republic maintain -- here I will cite Thomas Jefferson among others -that the right to expatriate was so fundamental and so natural and so inherent that to deny it, even to legislate it out of -with -- to regulate it by heavy legislation, put it that way, would be contrary to the most fundamental principles of when
this country was founded. So that's the first part, traditional historical roots of the right claim.

The next element under Glucksberg, Your Honor, is that the right being claimed to be protected by the substantive due process must be part and parcel of what our concepts are of what the Court has described as ordered liberty.

And here again, without repeating the authorities that we cite to great extent in our brief, Your Honor can see that this too, this requirement too, has been more than adequately, not only alleged, but proved. And the government doesn't say a word about it.

In fact, Your Honor, what the government does say is -- well, I don't want to characterize it, but the government has said outright in its filings in this case that the right of expatriation can exist and only exist by virtue of statute. And the statute that the government has identified as the source of this right, and I can -- Your Honor has read it --

THE COURT: But do I need to reach that? I'm not -- I don't think I am being asked to determine whether the right to expatriate exists. I am being asked to determine what regulation and limitation the government can put on that right.

I mean, and why -- and assume I agree that the right to voluntarily expatriate is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Why wouldn't the renunciation fee pass strict scrutiny analysis?

MR. ZELL: First of all, $I$ urge Your Honor not to assume the existence of this right. That's something that courts have done up to now in different contexts, some of them cited by the government involving incarcerated persons and so on, which are not relevant here.

The time has come, and this is the case to do it, for the Court to --

THE COURT: Oh, boy. I have had my share of cases of the first impression on these issues. I don't know how I keep getting so lucky.

MR. ZELL: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay. And I wouldn't be the court to do it. I believe there are nine judges on the third floor that would be the ones to do it and nine more up the street.

MR. ZELL: Your Honor can take that tack, and we can address it in another forum. I think this is the case to do it.

But to answer Your Honor's question, hypothetically, assuming that there is a fundamental constitutionally protected right under the due process clause to expatriate, then the question becomes what is the standard. Your Honor has mentioned the strict scrutiny analysis. That's what we maintain would be the appropriate framework of analysis. Okay. That has not happened -- even that -- even in those cases that have discussed this hypothetically, none of them have applied
strict scrutiny.
In our case, we would suggest that when you apply strict scrutiny, there are two consequences of that decision, that analytical framework. First, the government must have a compelling interest in doing whatever it's trying to do impinging upon that right. And secondly, whatever the government's course of action may be, it has to be narrowly tailored to meet that compelling interest.

The courts have held, Your Honor -- and here you don't have to be making a decision of first impression -- that when it comes to regulating fundamental constitutional liberty, the budgetary concerns of the government are not a compeling interest. That's the first point.

The second point is -- and we have had this demonstrated to us in a very vivid manner by the government's notice of proposed rule making filed late Friday. And that is that the imposition, that the fixing of the amount of a fee, okay, in the cases they maintain vigorously throughout the filings in this case, that the $\$ 2,350$ fee was permissible under constitutional analysis.

And they maintain that the only proper framework for assessing the propriety of that fee, Your Honor, is the rational basis test. Of course. All we are doing is charging a fee and we are trying to recover for services. No. Under strict scrutiny, Your Honor, they must show that this is the
most narrowly tailored way to do it. And they just basically conceded by their notice of proposed rule making that the 2,350 fee, which they so vigorously defended up until now, until Friday, is not and was not the most narrowly tailored way to achieve the government's non-compelling interest.

THE COURT: To go back to your request that this is a case to find that there is a fundamental or constitutional right to expatriate, doesn't that fall afoul of the canons of statutory construction that $I$ have to apply in which all courts are instructed to, if the case can be decided without reaching the constitutional issue, then that is what we should do. Why should I reach a constitutional issue here if I don't have to?

MR. ZELL: Well, you have to.
THE COURT: Well, maybe not.
MR. ZELL: Our position is you have to. And Your Honor proposes doing that by assuming the existence of the right and then applying the appropriate standard.

THE COURT: It was simply a question. I wasn't saying that that is going to be my path. I was simply asking you if the regulation, assuming arguendo that $I$ find that there is a constitutional right, if it passes the strict scrutiny test. But that does -- and I asked you the question regarding statutory construction when you said, you know, it's finally time, that that issue needs to be made clear.

MR. ZELL: May I answer?

THE COURT: Yes. Although I forgot to say I've blocked off an hour for this. I can go a little further than that. But I realize my questions may have pulled you off from your argument.

I don't have any questions for you on your First and Eighth Amendment claims. My next questions would be on customary international law claims. So if you want to make argument up to then, go ahead.

MR. ZELL: Well, I just want to respond very briefly to the constitutional avoidance doctrine, okay, which is appropriate when you are construing a statute and the statute governs the full panoply of rights being at issue in a case. This is not the case here. In fact, I have already mentioned that with respect to the $\$ 450$ fee, we don't have an APA claim. So there's no statute to construe. So the constitutional avoidance doctrine really has no applicability in that situation. We argue also with respect to the rest of the case.

Now turning to Your Honor's question about customary international law. When $I$ was reviewing and preparing for this hearing, one of the things I did is read all of the government's rule-making publications from 2010 all the way to 2015 excluding Friday's latest development. And one of the things I saw on there was that, in responding to comments that were issued -- I believe this is the case, and I may be mixing up either 2010 versus 2014, 2015, but people -- public comments
that were submitted raised this very issue about the propriety of the renunciation fee under international law.

And what was interesting, Your Honor, is that the government specifically referred to the universal declaration of human rights, which addresses this issue. And the government in its response to this, made to this comment, was not to say there's no customary international law rule regarding renunciation fees, okay, or affecting the right of expatriation. They simply said, we don't think our renunciation fee impinges upon the right, whatever the source.

Okay. And when you look at their brief, and Your Honor has read them and you will see this too, what does the government say that -- it doesn't argue that there's no international legal principle, CIL principle, regarding expatriation.

What they say is, under the certain decisions of the International Court of Justice, this rule has not arisen to the level of customary international law. They don't dispute the fact that international law relates to this issue in a very dramatic way, just as they didn't relate to it when they were commenting on the public's comments on the effect of the renunciation fee on the right to expatriate.

So now the decision that the Court would need to make is whether or not the government is correct or we are correct in our assertion of the principle that there is a right of
expatriation under international law, and the imposition of fees that would be in excess of that which is necessary and desirable for the governments to administer their system of consular services, whether that would be violative of this principle of international law.

THE COURT: You gave me a selective list of
renunciation fees around the world, which is ECF No. 14-3. I assume that's not an exhaustive list. Of the 16 countries that are listed, 10 charge a fee. None of these fees are nominal except maybe perhaps India's $\$ 25$ fee, which I would probably argue is a lot more money in India than it is here.

How does this exhibit support your argument that the right to voluntarily expatriate free from more than a nominal fee is protected under customary international law?

MR. ZELL: This goes to the question of what is the proper source of customary international law, which I admit is a rather esoteric inquiry.

THE COURT: It's the first time $I$ have had to have the issue.

MR. ZELL: We don't have the time to discuss opinio juris and all these other doctrines.

What's interesting is that in our list -- and I have asked my colleague to pull up the list because I don't remember exactly what's on it. I know in many countries I come -- our offices are in Israel and the -- which is a very small country,
to be sure, but it gets a lot of headlines. And in Israel, there is no fee or one that would be described as a pittance. All right.

And, in fact, Your Honor, this is really a very interesting thing, is that for 200 years of this nation's history, 200 years, no small amount of time, Your Honor, the United States did not charge a penny for this privilege, right to expatriate. And it only came in 2010. And then they went to 450. And four years later, five years later, they came up with this five-time fee which they are now trying to whitewash and reduce --

THE COURT: I understand that timeline.
MR. ZELL: -- and charge this enormous sum, which is what we did -- what we were referring to in our papers, has no comparable amount anywhere on this planet, that fee.

Now the question is, does 450 meet that, or was it maybe 300 or maybe 200 or maybe 50? I don't know. And that's something that we would have to -- and we have some ideas for Your Honor about how we might explore the reasonableness or the appropriateness of the government's charges or attempt to defray these costs, you know, as this litigation continues.

THE COURT: Let me ask you, under your APA claim, you are not in accordance with the law claims, you allege that the 2015 final law violated the APA because it was not in accordance with the law. Defendants moved for summary judgment
on this claim. And you didn't respond in opposition with any arguments. So why shouldn't I treat that as conceded?

MR. ZELL: Well, okay. I am -- my response to that would be based on OMB Circular A-25, which the government relies on heavily in their papers. Okay. And in that particular document, which is really the official interpretation and implementation of the IOAA, a 1954 statute, and the Presidential Proclamation of 195 --

THE COURT: No. Sir, what I am asking you is, you didn't respond to the argument in your opposition. So why shouldn't I treat the government's argument as conceded?

MR. ZELL: We have responded to the argument about the authority of the United States government to impose renunciation, a renunciation fee, vel non, okay, under their claimed authorities. They claim 31 U.S.C. 9701, they claim 22 U.S.C. 1419 -- 4219, and, of course, the OMB Circular, which is the primary source of their authority, 825.

And we say in our papers, and we responded to that, that these authorities do not justify the claimed imposition of this fee. The government says they can apply a fee. And we say no, 825 requires that the government confer a special benefit in order to charge a user fee. And we say you don't -you don't -- the government of the United States is not providing the general public with a special benefit when it comes to the right to expatriate. That's a fundamental right
of every U.S. citizen. And they -- it doesn't come from, like, a license from the government to do that. The government -for the country. What the government says they are trying to do is somewhat to protect that right by imposing these requirements about doing an oath in front of a consular official and doing all these other procedures which are very minimalistic and using that as a basis for the argument that they can regulate this fee under these authorities. We say no, 825 does not permit that.

THE COURT: I'm really trying to pin you down. I know you want to make some very broad statements about the righteousness of your claim, but I'm really here to ask very specific questions about your pleadings.

You allege that the 2015 final rule is in excess of jurisdiction in violation of 5 U.S.C., Section 7062(c). That's in paragraph 203 of your complaint. Defendants move to dismiss this claim. And you didn't respond to their argument in your opposing motion.

Again, why shouldn't I treat this argument -- this aspect of their motion as conceded?

MR. ZELL: I think you need to, with all great
respect, see the complaint as an entirety. Okay. And when you see the complaint as an entirety together with our oppositions that we filed to the government's motion to dismiss, you will see that it can be reasonably inferred from our complaint,
which goes into extraordinary detail, that we maintain that the government's authority -- the government did not have the authority under existing law, I have just mentioned to Your Honor the principal source of it, 825, which does not confer a specific benefit and, therefore, is not eligible for a user charge.

And in addition to that, we also say in our papers that the government -- and we say this specifically. If you want chapter and verse, I will have to search for it. We have it here -- that the government, when they went to impose this user charge, as they describe it, under 825 and the statutes that we've mentioned, they never, ever took into account the fundamental right of the plaintiffs to expatriate.

And we, based on that oversight on the part of the government -- which they never addressed. If Your Honor wants to ask about pleading formalities, the government never addressed those arguments in our papers regarding this under their APA claim. They simply said no, we can do it. This is a rational basis. It's user charts. It's authorized by Congress, not related to renunciation fees, but as general cost recoupment authorities and, therefore, that's it, that the Court needn't go further than that. That's our authority.

We say no. You didn't have the authority to do this under 825, and perhaps even more importantly, you did not take into consideration the all-important fact that the right being
that you are proposing to impinge upon here in a dramatic fashion is fundamentally protected, whether by the Constitution, Your Honor, under the due process clause or under the First Amendment or even under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and the Expatriation Act of 1868, et cetera, if you want to look for statutory sources.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
I don't have any further questions for you, but if there are some additional points you wanted to make, I will give you a few minutes to wrap up.

MR. ZELL: Well, this is -- Your Honor, this is the government's motion.

THE COURT: I know. They have the burden.
So I am going to turn to you, Ms. Lum. I have a similar question.

You have heard plaintiffs have argued that the right to voluntarily expatriate is deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition and a fundamental right. And, I mean, don't they have a point? I mean, it's founded by -- this country is founded by people, partially by people who renounced their British citizenship to form this country. And wouldn't the founding fathers agree that the right to renounce citizenship is an inherent or natural right?

MS. LUM: So, Your Honor, there's no dispute about whether it's important to be able to be permitted to
expatriate, and the Department of State certainly provides the means.

THE COURT: I'm not asking if it's important. I am asking whether it is a fundamental right, as counsel for the plaintiffs have said it, perhaps a constitutional dimension such that the Fifth Amendment due process rights apply?

MS. LUM: Right. So it certainly has its roots and recognition of its importance in statute, but it doesn't rise to the level of a fundamental right that should be recognized under the Fifth Amendment.

THE COURT: Assuming I decided -- again, I am going to ask you the same question that I asked plaintiffs. Assuming for the purposes of argument that I decide it is, how does your regulation, your fee, pass strict scrutiny?

MS. LUM: So at that point, it would be the compelling interest in the government recuperating the costs of providing this fee, which is very costly.

THE COURT: But --
MS. LUM: -- to --
THE COURT: I'm sorry, I forgot your name, sir. Is it Mr. Zell?

MR. ZELL: Yes.
THE COURT: Mr. Zell points out that the government charged no fee for many, many years. And I understand that in imposing a fee, the government's rationale was that the
costs -- that these renunciations were taking up significant amounts of consular administrative time and, therefore, were getting -- and were getting expensive, so this was a sort of covering those costs.

But then the fee jumps from 450 to 2,350. How does that pass strict scrutiny?

MS. LUM: So the explanation for the jump in the fee from zero to 450 to the current amount tracks with the high increase in demand.

THE COURT: Did the high increase in demand track certain changes in the tax laws?

MS. LUM: I believe that after the changes in the tax laws, the demand ended up increasing. At the time the $\$ 450$ fee was imposed, the State Department indicated that it was less than a fourth of what the actual cost to the department was. So it's not so much that in the two-year period the cost of the department jumped that much. It's that the cost of the department was that high when the $\$ 450$ fee was imposed, and then the department decided to charge the full actual cost.

THE COURT: But now they have gone back down, so it doesn't seem such a compelling interest.

MS. LUM: So in response to that, Your Honor, it's not that the government, in reducing the fee to 450 , is trying to recuperate the full cost. It's just that they, in doing so, they would be choosing not to recuperate those full costs.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, doesn't the fact that this jumped to 450 and then from 450 to 2,350 and abruptly back to 450, doesn't that lend itself to an inference that this fee is not so narrowly drawn to reimbursement for costs? That's a pretty big jump. I could understand if it went from 450 to 550 to 700, and well, maybe there's been a reduction in the number, so we are going back town to 600 or 500 . But to jump from 450 to 2,350 and then 2,350 back to 450, one might conclude that that there doesn't seem to be a whole lot of reason for such drastic changes in the fees, or at least that reason doesn't seem to be based on recoupment of actual costs.

I'm sorry. Sir, what are you doing?
MR. ZELL: I just needed to get information. Sorry. Excuse me, Your Honor.

MS. LUM: Your Honor, the question of narrow tailoring really goes to whether the fee is narrowly tailored to meeting the government interest of full recuperation of costs.

THE COURT: Right. So how is this fee narrowly tailored if it goes from 0 to 450, from 450 to 2,350, and back down to 450 again? How is that narrowly tailored?

MS. LUM: Right. It's narrowly tailored because the only fee that was intended to recuperate the full cost is --

THE COURT: Recoup.
MS. LUM: Recuperate.
THE COURT: Recoup, not recuperate. Recuperate is to
recover from illness.
MS. LUM: Fair, Your Honor. Thank you. To recoup the full cost, the only fee that's narrowly tailored towards that is $\$ 2,350$ fee. And the $\$ 450$ fee was set lower for public policy reasons acknowledging that it was not to recoup the full cost.

THE COURT: So what you saying is the government has decided to go back to taking a loss? In lowering the fee from 2,350 to 450 , the government has made some sort of a decision to go back to taking a loss on the cost of these renunciations? What you are saying is the 450 doesn't cover the full cost.

MS. LUM: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And so what's a rational basis for going up and then going back down?

MS. LUM: So that is something that would be explained in the forthcoming rule making, and the department is pursuing that rule making to reduce the fee.

THE COURT: But doesn't the fact that that rule making has now been instituted to go back to what it was -- to take the fee back to what it was lend some sort support to the argument that the fee is not really connected to anything real?

MS. LUM: I don't think it lends support to the argument that the fee is not connected to anything real because the fee can be connected to real costs, and then the State Department can make public policy decisions about whether it is
going to attempt to recoup those full costs or not.
THE COURT: Can you explain to me the cost of service model methodology that consular affairs uses and how it was applied to the 2015 renunciation fee.

MS. LUM: Yeah, so I think that the most helpful page in the administrative record for this would be page 190. That sets out a chart breaking down some of those costs. And the cost of service model tracks what the guidance is from OMB about what types of costs should be considered when you are calculating the full cost of a fee.

So that includes direct costs, and it also includes indirect costs. And that can include things like rent, utilities, management services, IT support, all of that.

And so the cost of service model takes into account labor costs and other compensation costs for staff for the amount of time that they put into this particular service. Then it also looks at the amount of total time that the department spends on provision of the service and then breaks down what you might characterize as overhead-type costs by the percentage that should be allocated to the renunciation or provision of a CLN service.

So that's what the breakdown reflects on page 190 of the administrative record, is those direct costs and also the indirect costs that are properly assigned to the service.

THE COURT: Can you respond to the plaintiffs'
argument that the Department of State doesn't even need to do a final rule making if it wants to reduce the fee. It could just simply reduce the fee. And why not -- what is the -- I mean, it seems pretty sort of selective to go without rule making from 450 to 2,350, but then impose rule making to go from 2,350 to 450. What is the basis for that?

MS. LUM: So plaintiffs' counsel indicated that it was an interim final rule that had public comment follow the final rule 60 days afterwards instead of preceding the rule. That was still a rule making. And the department hasn't specified exactly what type of rule making it intends to undergo. And this process involves consulting with other agencies including OMB. So they are still working out what exactly will make -THE COURT: I guess I'm finding it difficult to understand the different justifications because, as plaintiffs' counsel said, the Department of State went to a fee that was, I guess, maybe four times higher than it had been rather summarily and now is saying, well, we are going reduce it, we are going to go back to the old fee, but we need to go through -- we need to consult with the OMB, we need to go through all these steps.

Someone who is cynical might argue that that's an attempt to sort of forestall a ruling here to say, well, wait, we are going to change it.

Is this notice of final rule making -- I mean, why go
through the steps when you are going right back to the fee that you had before for which I assume a cost of service model methodology was used the first time?

MS. LUM: Right. I think when Your Honor is saying why go through all the steps, I believe you are referring to why go through a final rule --

THE COURT: Yeah, why go through a final rule making?
MS. LUM: Right, with notice and comment prior to that rule making. And I guess what I am saying is that that's not necessarily the route that the State Department intends to take and --

THE COURT: But you don't know? Sitting right here, you don't know what route they intend to take?

MS. LUM: I don't know because they have to consult with other agencies. But I guess I am saying that they could go through with an interim final rule process which would be the same process that was used to impose the $\$ 450$ fee.

THE COURT: Did they have to consult with other agencies when they went from the 450 to 2,350?

MS. LUM: I believe so, yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Is that anywhere in the record?
MS. LUM: I can look at the final rule to see if it shows up there.

THE COURT: All right. Those were my questions. You can complete the rest of your argument on anything I didn't ask
you about if you wish now.
MS. LUM: Okay. Your Honor, I would just emphasize, in terms of the Fifth Amendment, to respond some of the things plaintiffs' counsel was saying, that the plaintiffs' have failed to give a careful description of what a right would be that would be recognized as fundamental. And that's a critical importance because the Supreme Court has emphasized that if courts are to recognize a new fundamental right, they should be very cautious in doing so, and that right would have to be carefully described. And here plaintiffs aren't even able to tell the Court what --

THE COURT: I mean, a right to renunciate citizenship is not very complicated, right? You no longer wish to be a citizen of the United States. There's nothing really -- it's actually a lot simpler than a lot of the other rights that litigants seek to have declared as fundamental rights. It's the right to relinquish citizenship that, for whatever reason, you don't want to have anymore.

I guess plaintiffs would make the argument that it's even more fundamental than the right to seek citizenship. I don't need to reach that issue. But it's pretty simple, isn't it? I mean, and citizenship is mentioned in the Constitution. If you are born here, you have a constitutional right to United States citizenship. So how is a right to relinquish that citizenship which the Constitution vests you with, how is that
not equally fundamental?
MS. LUM: So in narrative form, Your Honor, it may sound simple to describe it that way, but the problem is that plaintiffs can't answer the Court's question of what number between $\$ 2$ and $\$ 450$ would be violative of such a right.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, I'm trying to find an analogy of a substantive fundamental right. Maybe voting. You couldn't impose a poll tax. Those have been ruled upon, right, because that -- those wouldn't stand up to constitutional scrutiny. So why isn't plaintiffs' argument about the fee to renunciate citizenship similar to that of a poll tax?

MS. LUM: It's not similar because it's much more analogous to the types of cases the government has cited where the fee is solely for the administrative processing costs.

THE COURT: It costs money to vote. It costs money to run the electoral system. You have to pay poll workers. You have to print out ballots. You have to -- you know, it's an expensive undertaking.

But I would imagine any attempt to try and charge citizens for their -- and again, this is assuming this is a fundamental right -- but to charge citizens for exercising their right to vote by saying, well, you got to recoup the cost -- it costs us a lot of money to put on these elections. More people are voting than ever. We need to recover the costs, so we are going to charge you a fee, any kind of fee, to
recoup the costs. The government couldn't do that, do you agree?

MS. LUM: Right, not the poll tax. But here I think it's a little bit different because the service that's being provided is the receipt of a CLN, so a certificate of loss of nationality. And then that certificate can be used for various purposes. And so it's the provision of that certificate, not just the ability to renounce or --

THE COURT: So is it more like a passport? Is that your analogy, you know, that not every citizen has a passport, but every citizen apply for a passport, and if you want the passport, you have to pay a fee?

MS. LUM: Yes, I think you could draw analogies to that. You could also draw analogies to, for example, the Cox versus New Hampshire case where citizens have a right to demonstrate and have a public meeting, but they might have --

THE COURT: The problem with the certificate argument, though, is that you can't renunciate and say, okay, well, I'm going to renunciate. I don't want the certificate. I just want to renounce my citizenship, but you can keep the certificate, so I don't need to pay the fee.

It's all part and parcel of the same proceeding, correct?

MS. LUM: It is, although I believe there is some D.C. Circuit possibility dicta indicating that renunciation can
happen prior to the certificate being provided, so I think that the law has sometimes drawn some distinctions between those two things.

But the main point here with the Fifth Amendment, Your Honor, is that the Court need not reach the issue of whether there is a fundamental right to expatriate or to do so without a fee because it's under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, also because no court has ever chosen to recognize that as a fundamental right.

THE COURT: Did you want to address the customary international law claims and First and Eighth amendment claims?

MS. LUM: Sure. I will briefly address those if that would be helpful to the Court.

THE COURT: I didn't have any questions on it. You are the proponent of the motion so...

MS. LUM: Yes. In response to what plaintiffs' counsel had shared about their arguments for customary international law, I would point out, as the Court did, that none of the fees from the other countries that they propose are nominal. And so even if you have consistent state practice of charging a fee that is less than what the United States charges, the test for customary international law has not been met, one, because those fees are not nominal either, and two, because there's no indication and plaintiffs have not shown that the countries has set their fees at the amount they have
set them because they believe that there is a legal reason that they have to do that.

And that's the second prong of the customary
international law test, and so there is no customary
international law that would require a fee that's lower than what the State Department is charging.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you all. These are very interesting questions.

MR. ZELL: May I respond briefly?
THE COURT: Very briefly.
MR. ZELL: First of all, with regard to the --
(There was an interruption by the court reporter.)
THE COURT: Is your microphone on?
MR. ZELL: Yeah, sorry.
With regard to --
THE COURT: And you need to get --
MR. ZELL: With regard to --
THE COURT: You need to get a little closer to it so that the -- I can hear you, but the court reporter, who is wearing headphones, needs you to be close to the microphone.

MR. ZELL: I'm with you.
So first of all, I made a misstatement about the Israeli fee for renunciation. Our exhibits show it's about \$105. So I want to correct that. I don't want to misstate.

If you look down our list, France is free. Luxembourg
is free. Germany, the largest country in the European Union, free. The United Kingdom charges 372, which is along the lines of that 450. Ireland is free. Italian is 250 euros. Austria, 25 euros, et cetera. Russia, 65. Okay. Mexico is free. Canada, I understand from my colleague from Toronto, is \$100 Canadian. Okay.

So these are not -- these are a lot less, a lot less, than what the -- and what's interesting is the government didn't provide any data of its own on this issue. They could have easily done that. And they did not do that. That's the first point.

The second point is Your Honor asked about -- you know, to describe this cost of services model that the government used. Okay. I would like to refer Your Honor -I'm not going to read it here, but I would like to refer Your Honor to page 30 of the administrative record, which is an excerpt from the rule making that took place, the notice and comment period that took place March 24, 2010. And the government gave a very helpful description of this process that they were using in 2010, which they want to revert to, to describe how they go about fixing these actual costs.

And you will see it in the example on the last column of that page which analogizes the government's actual cost survey to the making of a peanut butter and jelly sandwich. And I kid you not. That's it.

And you can look at it there, and they will give you all of the analogies that Your Honor needs to understand what they did in 2010, which included the statement that the costs for renunciation were extremely costly, says the government. But they, by their own admission -- the records supports this, but -- the record that we were able to see because a lot of it is redacted shows that they had no idea in 2010 what their actual costs were. They were making peanut butter and jelly sandwiches.

And they didn't have the data until 2013, and then they used it to justify the quintupling of the fee to 450. So Your Honor can read that just as well as I can.

The other thing about the 2010 rule making, to which they are referring in their latest notice, is something very interesting because it describes -- and counsel referred to it in her remarks. Why is it -- Your Honor asked, how come you were able to justify recouping only $\$ 450$ of your actual costs of these extremely costly procedures in 2010. And you know what the government said about this? It's very interesting. And counsel alluded to this. They said, for public policy reasons, for public policy reasons, we didn't think it would be a good idea to recoup the full amount of the actual costs, whatever they were guesstimated to have been.

What the government said was, we believe that we should keep the fee lower than the actual cost in 2010 in order
to -- not to discourage the renunciates and exercising their right, exercising this procedure -- they didn't call it a right -- exercising this procedure. And you know what they said? They said that doing so, keeping it below cost, was in the national interest. That is a quote. And they repeated that again back in 2014 and 2015.

Now, as I finish my remarks, I just have four questions that I would like to put onto the record.

Why is the government flip-flopping, okay, at this point in time? Your Honor alluded to that question.

When does the government intend to implement the fee reduction? It can do it, as Your Honor asked counsel, immediately if it wished to do so. Why the delay?

Who does the fee -- who does the fee reduction apply to? Is it only to accidental Americans like my clients, the plaintiffs in this case? Does it apply to the other relinquishment categories in $1481(a)(1)$ through (a) (4) and (a) (6) and (a)7? What about indigents who can't afford it?

And by the way, there are allegations in the complaint uncontroverted by the government, not even cited to by the government, which the Court under our 12(b)(6) jurisprudence is required to take --

THE COURT: You are not asserting that your clients are indigent, are you?

MR. ZELL: Some of my clients are indigent, yes. They
say specifically in the complaint, Your Honor, they can't afford the $\$ 2,350$ fee. And they would say the same thing about, some of them, not all of them, about the $\$ 450$ fee.

And how does the government intend to implement this rule making that they are talking about? I think we need, as we go forward with this litigation, okay, we need to be able to learn more about what the government was doing with its cost analysis both in 2010 and in 2015 and here in 2023. That means, in our view, Your Honor, that we need to conduct either supplemental briefing, maybe that's an idea that we need to do, or --

THE COURT: I don't think we need supplemental briefing.

MR. ZELL: -- discovery
THE COURT: I am intending to rule on this in due course, as soon as I can, given all the other matters I am dealing with. I appreciate the parties' preparation for this and their arguments today.

I also encourage the parties to keep talking. You've already said, Mr. Zell, that the reduction to 450 would not extinguish your claims, but it may narrow the litigation, the focus of the litigation somewhat. So if you all can come to some agreement on that, if the government could provide more information to plaintiffs about this proposed rule making which we've all just learned about literally days ago, that might be
more helpful.

But other than that, I will -- I don't think we need supplemental briefing at this point. I will consider the request for additional discovery if $I$ think it is needed. But thank you all.

MR. ZELL: Thank you, Your Honor.
(The hearing concluded at 3:32 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that the foregoing is an accurate transcription of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
s/ Tammy Nestor
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| W | 33/6 33/9 33/19 34/5 34/19 | Z |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| what... [32] 22/9 23/3 27/15 | 36/13 36/18 37/5 38/14 | Zell [10] 1/12 1/12 2/5 5/13 |  |
| 28/12 29/7 29/11 29/19 |  | 5/15 6/23 6/25 26/21 26/23 |  |
| 29/20 30/8 30/9 30/19 30/22 | wouldn't [5] 9/19 14/24 15/12 | 41/20 |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 31 / 331 / 631 / 1131 / 1332 / 9 \\ & 32 / 1333 / 533 / 1134 / 436 / 16 \end{aligned}$ | wrap [1] 25/10 | zero [1] 27/8 |  |
| 36/21 37/6 38/8 39/2 39/7 | Y |  |  |
| 39/19 39/24 40/3 40/18 41/7 | Yeah [4] 5/3 30/5 32/7 37/14 |  |  |
| what's [5] 9/22 20/22 20/24 29/13 38/8 | year [2] 12/16 27/16 |  |  |
| whatever [6] 6/14 16/5 16/6 | years [7] 6/10 7/12 21/5 21/6 |  |  |
| 19/10 33/17 39/23 | 21/9 21/9 26/24 |  |  |
| whatsoever [1] $2 / 17$ | Yehuda [1] 1/13 |  |  |
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| 4/13 4/16 4/20 7/11 11/11 | 36/16 40/25 |  |  |
| 11/17 12/5 13/25 16/2 16/10 | yet [1] 12/23 |  |  |
| 17/23 18/11 18/19 19/11 | York [1] 13/12 |  |  |
| 27/18 30/9 32/1 32/4 32/19 | you [140] 2/11 2/12 3/22 |  |  |
| 40/11 | 3/23 3/23 3/23 3/24 3/25 4/6 |  |  |
| where [2] 34/13 35/15 | 4/7 4/15 4/22 5/1 5/11 5/18 |  |  |
| whether [10] 5/8 14/19 19/24 | 5/21 5/22 6/7 6/7 6/8 6/11 |  |  |
| 20/4 25/2 25/25 26/4 28/16 | 8/11 8/12 8/13 8/14 10/15 |  |  |
| 29/25 36/5 | 11/4 11/5 11/17 11/20 12/8 |  |  |
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| 17/3 17/9 18/10 19/5 20/2 | 18/3 18/5 18/7 18/11 19/11 |  |  |
| 20/7 20/10 20/16 20/25 | 19/12 20/6 21/21 21/22 |  |  |
| 21/10 21/13 22/4 22/6 22/16 | 21/22 21/23 22/1 22/9 22/9 |  |  |
| 23/6 24/1 24/4 24/15 26/17 | 22/22 22/23 23/10 23/11 |  |  |
| 32/2 32/16 33/25 38/2 38/16 | 23/14 23/17 23/21 23/22 |  |  |
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| 40/21 41/24 | 25/6 25/7 25/8 25/9 25/10 |  |  |
| whichever [1] 3/25 | 25/14 25/16 26/12 28/12 |  |  |
| while [1] 13/1 | 29/2 29/7 29/11 30/2 30/9 |  |  |
| whitewash [1] 21/10 | 30/19 30/25 32/1 32/2 32/5 |  |  |
| who [9] 4/21 5/13 9/6 25/20 | $32 / 1232 / 13$ 32/24 33/1 33/1 |  |  |
| 31/22 37/19 40/14 40/14 | 33/13 33/18 33/23 33/23 |  |  |
| 40/18 | 33/25 34/7 34/16 34/16 |  |  |
| who's [1] 3/17 | 34/17 34/17 34/22 34/25 |  |  |
| whole [1] 28/9 | 35/1 35/10 35/11 35/12 |  |  |
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| 14/24 17/11 22/2 22/10 | 36/10 36/14 36/20 37/7 |  |  |
| 23/19 31/3 31/25 32/5 32/6 | 37/16 37/18 37/19 37/20 |  |  |
| 32/7 34/10 39/16 40/9 40/13 | 37/21 37/25 38/12 38/22 |  |  |
| will [18] 3/5 3/19 4/12 5/16 | 38/25 39/1 39/1 39/16 39/18 |  |  |
| 10/23 11/17 12/17 13/21 | $40 / 340 / 2340 / 2441 / 2242 / 5$ |  |  |
| 19/12 23/24 24/9 25/9 31/13 | 40/3 40/23 40/24 41/22 42 |  |  |
| 36/12 38/22 39/1 42/2 42/3 |  |  |  |
| wish [4] 3/23 11/25 33/1 | your [89] 2/2 2/12 3/19 4/1 |  |  |
| 33/13 |  |  |  |
| wished [1] 40/13 |  |  |  |
| withdraw [1] 11/5 | 9/16 9/25 11/5 11/15 11/16 |  |  |
| within [2] 11/21 12/22 | 11/23 12/8 12/9 12/12 13/14 |  |  |
| without [5] 11/21 14/7 17/10 | $13 / 15 \quad 13 / 20 \quad 14 / 314 / 8 \quad 14 / 12$ |  |  |
| 31/4 36/6 | 14/17 15/1 15/15 15/18 |  |  |
| word [1] 14/11 | 15/21 16/9 16/22 16/25 17/6 |  |  |
| work [1] 4/25 | 17/15 18/4 18/5 18/18 19/3 |  |  |
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| working [1] 31/13 | 21/22 22/10 23/12 23/13 |  |  |
| world [1] 20/7 | 23/16 23/17 24/3 24/15 25/3 |  |  |
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| 19/23 20/2 20/4 20/10 21/2 | 39/12 39/16 39/17 40/10 |  |  |
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[^0]:    0

[^1]:    

[^2]:    

[^3]:    /19

